Most of Aristotle’s work has been lost, but what has survived the messy history of transmission is an incredible and awe-inspiring collection of thoughts and observations. Though there certainly are better translations than mine out there, I would like to carefully examine the Greek texts over the course of my life and translate and retranslate them myself for my own sake–for pleasure and to improve my understanding of Ancient Greek and of Aristotle.
Please find below my own personal record of bits and pieces of Aristotle’s work I have translated as I build my @AristotleWalks page or use them in papers I write. The texts are ordered as follows: first, the texts with Bekker numbers, of August Immanuel Bekker (1785–1871); then, the texts without Bekker numbers.
The * indicates texts that are contested by scholars, i.e. scholars are unsure about whether that text was really written by Aristotle.
The ** indicates texts that are agreed to be spurious, i.e. fake.
71b9-16
Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ’ ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ’ αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι’ ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ’ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὁτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ ἐπίστασθαί ἐστι ‧ καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι οἱ μὲν οἴονται αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ ἔχουσιν, ὥστε οὗ ἁπλως ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν.
from Ross (1964), but following Coislinianus 330 for αὐτό at b14.
A2 We think (οἴομαι) that we know (ἐπίσταμαι) something unqualifiedly–and not in the sophistic way, i.e. accidentally–whenever we think (οἴομαι) that we know (γιγνώσκω) the cause (αἰτία) on which the matter depends that it is the cause of it and that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. Well then it is clear that to know (ἐπίσταμαι) is something of this sort, for, the ones who do not know (ἐπίσταμαι) and the ones who do know both think (οἴομαι) that it is so, but the latter additionally understands that it is so, with the result that when there is knowledge of something unqualifiedly, that ‘something’ is impossible to be otherwise.
[164b8-15]
Οὐχ ἅπαντι δὲ διαλεκτέον, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα γυμναστέον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πρὸς ἐνίους φαύλους γίνεσθαι τοὺς λόγους. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν παντως πειρώμενον φαίνεσθαι διαφεύγειν δίκαιον μὲν πάντως πειρᾶσθαι συλλογίσασθαι, οὐκ εὔσχημον δέ. διόπερ οὐ δεῖ συνεστάναι εὐχερῶς πρὸς τοὺς τυχόντας ‧ ἀνάγκη γὰρ πονηρολογίαν συμβαίνειν ‧ καὶ γὰρ οἱ γυμναξόμενοι ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι μὴ ἀγωνιστικῶς.
VIII.14 You must not engage in argument with everyone, nor practice on anyone you happen to come across, for unfortunately against some people arguments necessarily degenerate. For against the person who does anything to escape from seeming beaten, it is just to try out anything to reach your conclusion, but it is not good form. Thus, it is necessary to not engage heedlessly with anyone you happen to come across, for unfortunately bad-reasoning necessarily follows. For, also, the ones who are practicing are unable to keep away from arguing contentiously.
[165a20-25]
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστί τισι μᾶλλον πρὸ ἔργου τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι σοφοῖς ἢ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὖσα δ’ οὔ, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὔσης), δῆλον ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον δοκεῖν ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν.
I.1 And then for some it is more profitable to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming to be so (for sophistry is seeming wise without being so, and the sophist makes money from seeming wise rather than being so). It is clear that for them it is necessary to seem to do work of the wise person more than to actually do it without seeming to.
[172b36-173a2]
ἔτι δ’ ἐκ τῶν βουλήσεων καὶ τῶν φανερῶν δοξῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ βούλονταί τε καὶ φασίν, ἀλλὰ λέγουσι μὲν τοὺς εὐσχημονεστάτους τῶν λόγων, βούλονται δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα λυσιτελεῖν· οἷον τεθνάναι καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ ζῆν ἡδέως φασὶ δεῖν, καὶ πένεσθαι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ πλουτεῖν αἰσχρῶς, βούλονται δὲ τἀναντία.
I.12 Further argue from people’s wishes/desires and their declared opinions. For people do not wish for the same things as they say they do. Rather they say the words that make them look best, but wish for the things that appear to profit them. E.g. they say that it is necessary to die nobly rather than to live in pleasure, and to justly work for one’s living rather than to be rich shamefully, but they wish for the opposite.
[193a3-9]
ὡς δ’ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι γελοῖον· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν πολλά. Τὸ δὲ δεικνύναι τὰ φανερὰ διὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ δι’ αὑτὸ γνώριμον (ὅτι δ’ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἄν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὢν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων), ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἶναι τὸν λόγον, νοεῖν δὲ μηδέν.
Β1 That ‘nature exists’ would be absurd to try to show [context: many philosophers before, during, and after Aristotle tried to do this a lot], for it is obvious that many things are of this sort [existing]. And to show [/prove] obvious things by obscurities is the mark of someone unable to distinguish between what is self-evident from what is not (that this [scenario] is possible is very clear, as when someone who is blind from birth would make inferences about colors), so as for it to be necessarily the case that their discussions concern words only, and they understand nothing.
[339b28-29]
οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσομεν ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς οὐδ’ ὀλιγάκις τὰς αὐτὰς δόξας ἀνακυκλεῖν γιγνομένας ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ’ ἀπειράκις.
I.3 …for in fact we say that the same opinions come about in repeating cycles among human beings not once, not twice, nor occasionally, but infinitely often.
[403a16-24]
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν ‧ ἅμα γὰρ τούοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ’ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίξηται. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν ‧ μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου.
I.1 And it seems that all of the affections of the soul involve the body–anger, temperateness, fear, pity, courage, as well as joy and loving and hating. For at the same time as these, the body is affected in some way. A sign of this is that sometimes strong and palpable affections occur without being provoked or made afraid, while at other times one is moved by small and almost imperceptible things, e.g. whenever the body is agitated and thus is like when it is angry. This is still more clear from that [sometimes] affections of a frightened person arise without anything frightening occuring.
[433b-19]
ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.
III.10 In sum, as has been said, it is insofar as an animal is capable of appetite/desire (ὄρεξις) that it is capable of moving itself; but it is not capable of desire without imagination (φαντασία). And all imagination is either rational or perceptual/sensory. And in the latter, the other [non-human] animals have a share as well.
[488b20-26]
καὶ τὰ μὲν πανοῦργα καὶ κακοῦργα, οἷον ἀλώπηξ, τὰ δὲ θυμικὰ καὶ φιλητικὰ καὶ θωπευτικά, οἷον κύων, τὰ δὲ πρᾶα καὶ τιθασσευτικά, οἷον ἐλέφας, τὰ δ’ αἰσχυντηλὰ καὶ φυλακτικά οἷον χήν, τὰ δὲ φθονερὰ καὶ φιλόκαλα, οἷον ταώς. βουλευτικὸν δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. καὶ μνήμης μὲν καὶ διδαχῆς πολλὰ κοινωνεῖ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δύναται πλὴν ἄνθρωπος.
Α1 And some [animals] are knavish and wicked, e.g. the fox; some are spirited, affectionate, and fawning e.g. the dog; some are gentle and easy to tame, e.g. the elephant; some are bashful and cautious, e.g. the goose, some are jealous and fond of beauty, e.g. the peacock. But among animals, human beings are the only ones able to deliberate. Further, memory and teaching is common with many [animals], but *recall/remembering* is possible for none others except human beings.
[610a3-4]
ἔστι δὲ τῶν θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ποέμια ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν τύχωσιν.
Θ(I)1 And there are of the wild animals, some that are always at war with each other and others that are only on occasion, like humans.
[715b15-16]
ἡ δὲ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀτελές, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος.
But Nature flees from [i.e. avoids] the infinite, for the infinite is incomplete and indeterminate—but Nature always seeks an end.
[980a21]
πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.
A1 All human beings by nature desire to know.
[982b11-19]
…διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περί τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ’ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων.
A2 …for it is due to wondering that human beings, both now and at first, began to do philosophy. In the beginning, they wondered about the puzzles close to hand. Then, advancing bit by bit, they worked through the puzzles about greater issues; for example, about the attributes of the moon and those about the sun and stars, and about the coming to be of everything. One who puzzles and wonders, however, thinks himself ignorant, and it is because of this that the philosopher is in a way a lover of myth, since myth is composed of wonders.
[993a30-b4]
Ὅτι ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπὴ τῇ δὲ ῥᾳδία. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτ’ ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι τυχεῖν αὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ’ ἕνα μὲν ἢ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίγνεσθαί τι μέγεθος.
α1 Contemplating the truth is in a way difficult and in a way easy; and a sign of this is that no one is able to hit upon it sufficiently [note: with a sense of worthiness, deservedness, etc.], nor do all (entirely) miss. Rather, while each says something concerning nature and individually contribute either little or nothing, gathering together from everyone is born something of great magnitude.
[995a27-33]
ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, ἀλλ’ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.
B1 And it is, for those who wish to resolve puzzles, useful to go through the puzzles well. For the subsequent state of having the puzzles resolved is the resolution of being puzzled earlier, and there is no untying of knots of which one is ignorant. But the puzzle in thought makes this (that there is a knot) clear concerning the (subject) matter, for in so far as thought is puzzled it is like those who have suffered being fettered, for it is impossible in both cases to move forward.
[1094b14-1095a3]
τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν‧ ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι’ ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων [20] καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων‧ πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται‧ παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ’ ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδυμένος, ἁπλῶς δ’ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος‧ ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων…
A1 Fine and just things–which political science investigates–differ and vary greatly, so that it may appear as though they are what they are by convention only, and not by nature. But goods also vary in the same way, when we consider the harms befalling many people because of them. For, some have died because of wealth, others because of courage. One must be content, then, while speaking about these sorts of things [i.e. matters of political science] and from these sorts of premises, to demonstrate the truth coarsely and in outline. And while speaking about thing which hold only for the most part and from these sorts of premises, [one must be content] also to draw conclusions of the same sort. It is also necessary to in the same way demonstrate each thing we discuss; for the educated person seeks out precision according to each kind, until so much, up to as much, admitted by the nature of the subject, for it appears similarly [absurd] to accept a mathematician arguing from probability as to ask a rhetorician for a proof. And each person judges well the things he knows and of these are a good judge. Thus, the person who has been educated in a field of knowledge judges well things in that field, and the person who has been educated in all areas of knowledge judges well, simpliciter. Because of this, a young person is not a suitable student of political science, for they are inexperienced in the actions concerning life.”
[1095a20-26]
περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἳ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ’ ἄλλο–πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον‧ νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον‧ συνειδότες δ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν.
Α2 But regarding what flourishing is, they dispute, and hoi polloi do not give the same answer as the wise. For some think that it is something obvious and clear—for example, pleasure, wealth or honor. Others think that it is something else. And often the same person thinks that it is another [i.e. the same person changes their mind], for when one is ill, one thinks it is health; when one is poor, one thinks it is wealth. And when they are aware of their own ignorance, they are in awe of whoever says big things that are beyond them.
[1095b22-30]
οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν‧ τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δ’ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου‧ δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι δ’ ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι‧ ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ’ οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ‧ δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.
Α3 The accomplished and pragmatic people pursue honor, for this is roughly speaking the telos (i.e. the end, goal) of the political life. But honor appears to be more superficial than what we’re looking for, since it seems to depend more on the people who honor than on the person being honored, and we’d expect the good to be something proper to and hard to take away from the one who has achieved it. Further, people who seek honor seem to pursue it to convince themselves as good; they at least seek to be honored by the wise men, among those who know them, and for virtue. It is thus clear that—in *their* view— virtue is superior to honor.
[1096a11-17]
Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. δόξειε δ’ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας ‧ ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
A4 Presumably it is better to examine the universal good, [i.e. Plato’s Form of the Good] and raise problems about the way it is spoken of, although this sort of inquiry is unpleasant because those who introduced the Forms [i.e. Plato &Co.] are our friends. Nevertheless it is presumably still better, if it’s needed for the preservation of truth, to demolish even what is close to us [i.e. the opinions of friends], especially if one is a philosopher. For though we love both [our friends and the truth], honoring the truth comes first.
[1098a7-8, 16-20]
εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου…. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν, εἰ δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα‧ οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ’ ὀλίγος χρόνος.
Α6 And if the function of a human being is ‘the activity of the soul according to reason or not without reason’ […and if other assumptions…], then the human good turns out to be ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. And we must add, ‘in a complete life’. For, one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. And in this way, neither blessed nor eudaimonious does one day [make a person], nor a short time.
[1098b23-29]
Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ’ ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς‧ ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες‧ οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ’ ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.
Α8 And it appears that the things being sought about εὐδαιμονία (happiness/flourishing) has all already been laid down. For to some it seems to be virtue, to others phronesis (practical wisdom/prudence), and to others wisdom. To others it seems to be all these or some of these alongside pleasure or not without pleasure. Others further add external prosperity. Some of these views are held by many and traditional, others are held by few widely esteemed people. Neither are entirely mistaken, but rather they are right in some or even many respects.
[1099a2-7]
ὥσπερ δ’ ‘Ολυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ’ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.
Α8 And just as in the Olympic Games, it is not the best and mightiest that are crowned, but the ones competing for the prize (for only some of these athletes may win); thus also the ones who act correctly are the ones that are crowned the noble and good things in life.
[1099b20-25]
εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα {τὰ} κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη.
A10 And if it is better to attain εὐδαιμονία thus [through some sort of learning or cultivation of virtue] than through fortune, then it is reasonable for it to be this way since things according to nature are naturally in the finest possible condition and thus similarly this is also the case for things according to craft and all cause (αἰτία), and especially for things according to the best cause; and it would be seriously outrageous to entrust what is great and finest to fortune.
Note: The content in the [] is pulled from 1099b15-16 and 19-20, I did not conjure it with fortune 😊
[1102a7-12]
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι‧ βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται.
A13 And it seems that the true politician has toiled away at this [i.e. virtue] most of all, for they want to make their citizens good and obedient to the laws. And as an example of this we have the Cretan and Lacedemonian [i.e. Spartan] legislators, and any others of the sort that has come into being.
[1103a35-b17, b21-22]
οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ’ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ‧ οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτον τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες: ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει: πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἳ μὲν δίκαιοι οἳ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἳ δὲ δειλοί. […] ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται.
B1 So, then, we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, and brave by doing brave actions. What happens in the cities is also witness to this, for the law-makers make citizens good by habituation, and this is what all law-makers intend. Those law-makers who do not do this well miss the mark, and it is in this respect that a good political constitution differs from a bad one. It is from and through [doing] the same things that every virtue is developed and destroyed, and similarly for every skill, for it is from playing the cithara (a Greek instrument) that both good and bad cithara-players come to exist. House-building and everything else resemble this too, for building houses well cultivates good builders, building badly cultivates bad ones. For if this were not the case, then there would be no need for anyone to teach [these skills], instead everyone would just become either good or bad [at these things]. Thus it is also in the case of the virtues, for *it is through acting the way we do in our dealings with other people that some of us become just and others unjust*; through acting as we do in frightening situations, and becoming habituated to be afraid or to be confident, that some of us become courageous and others become cowardly…. states of character arise [by repetition of] similar activities.
[1104a3-9]
τὰ δ’ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ’ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές… δεῖ δ’ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν…
Β2 The matters regarding actions and the things that are beneficial have nothing fixed, just like how matters of health do not… and it is necessary that the agents themselves always examine the things that promote what is opportune/advantageous.
[1105b12-18]
…ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ’ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ’ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.
Β3 …but the many do not do these [good actions], but take refuge in argument/words and think that they are doing philosophy and that they will thus become excellent [i.e. good, virtuous people], acting like sick people who listen carefully to their doctors but do none of the things they are ordered to do. Just as, then, these people will not improve their body by looking after themselves in such a way, neither will those [who do not actually do the good actions philosophy prescribes] improve their soul by engaging with philosophy in such a way.
[1109a24-30]
διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ’ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν.
B9 Wherefore it is also hard work to be excellent, for in each case it takes hard work to find the mean. For example, not everyone, but only the person who knows how finds the midpoint of a circle. And thus also it is easy for anyone to get angry or to give and spend money, but to do so to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right aim, and in the right way is not still for everyone, nor still easy. Thus, doing something well is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.
[1110a29-34]
ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν‧ ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ’ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά‧
Γ1 And it is sometimes difficult, however, to judge what [good] sort of thing should be chosen at the price of what [bad] sort of thing, and what should be endured as the price of what. It is still more difficult to abide by our judgment, for the expected outcomes are for the most part painful, and the actions we are compelled [to endure] are for the most part shameful.
[1110b13-15]
γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ’ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα.
Γ1 And it is ridiculous/laughable to make external factors responsible [for actions], and not oneself as someone easily caught by those sorts of [external] things; and then to make oneself responsible for fine/noble actions, but pleasant things responsible for base acts.
[1110b28-1111a2]
ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται‧ τὸ δ’ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα‧ οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ’ ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλ’ ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἐν οἶς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις‧ ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη‧
Γ2 Every vicious person, then, is ignorant of what they must do or must abstain from. This kind of mistake makes people unjust, and generally bad. But when someone is ignorant of what things are good for them it is not called ‘involuntary’, because the cause of involuntary action is not ignorance in the decision—which leads to vice, nor because of ignorance of the universal [proposition of something being good or bad]—for that one is blamed, but ignorance of the particulars, in within which the action consists and with which it is concerned, for it is on these [particulars] that both pity and pardon depend.
[1114a4-10]
…ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.
Γ5 But they [i.e. inattentive people] are themselves responsible for becoming this sort of person by living carelessly, and an unjust person or an intemperate person are themselves responsible for being unjust and intemperate—the former by doing bad things, and the latter by spending their life drinking and engaging in other such activities. For the activities, each in which a person engages, make the corresponding sort of person. This is clear from those training for any contest or action whatsoever, for they are continually engaging in the activity. Thus, to not know that the states [of character, e.g. unjust, intemperate, careless] come about from engaging in each [corresponding] activity is entirely senseless (literally: without perception).
[1114a31-b3]
εἰ δε τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ‧ εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος‧
Γ7 Now someone might say that everyone aims at the apparent good, but how it appears is not in their power, but on the contrary, how the end appears to each person depends on their state of character. Thus, if each person is in some way responsible for their own state of character, they are also in some way responsible for how the end appears.
[1115b24-28]
τῶν δ’ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ’ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ’ ἄν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς
Γ10 Of the people who go to the excesses [i.e. do not hit the mean], the [excessively] fearless person is anonymous [i.e. there is no name for it in Greek in Aristotle’s day] (and we said before that many cases are anonymous). And they would be some sort of madman, or a person incapable of feeling pain, if they should fear nothing—neither earthquake nor waves, just as they say of the Celts.
[1120b20-23]
οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ’ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ’ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν.
Δ2 [The generous person] will *not* give to the wrong people, nor at the wrong time, etc. For this would not be acting according to generosity, and spending up their wealth towards these [wrong recipients], they would not have anything left to spend for those they must.
[1124b31-1125a2]
καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ’ ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες.
Δ1 And he is unable to live towards [i.e. for the sake of] another, unless for a friend, for this is slave-like; and for this reason all flatters are menial, and inferior people are flatters.
[1125a3-5]
οὐδὲ μνησίκακος: οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν.
Δ [The great-souled person] is not vengeful; for a great-souled person does not call [insignificant/lesser] things to mind, especially of bad things done to them, but rather look past them.
[1125b31-6a6]
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται ‧ πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν ‧ ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν ‧ οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ’ ἔλλειψις, εἴτ’ ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ’ ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἐργιζόμενοι ἐφ’ οἶς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ’ ὅτε μηδ’ οἷς δεῖ‧
Δ11 Thus, the one who gets angry at the right things and towards the right people, also in the right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time is praised. This would be the even-tempered person, if indeed their even temper is praised. For the even-tempered person is undisturbed and not to be driven by their feelings, but is angered only when reason commands, thus in the right way and for the right length of time. And they seem to err more towards deficiency because the even-tempered person is inclined not to punish but more to forgive.
The deficiency, whether it is some lack of gall or whatever, is
objected to, because people who are not angered by the right things are foolish, as are those who are angered in the wrong way, at the wrong time, and towards the wrong people.
[1139a23-5]
δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία…
Z2 For these reasons, it is necessary for what issues in from reason to be true and for desire to be correct, if the decision is to be excellent.
[1139a31-36]
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ’ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ’ ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια δ’ αὐτὴ οὐθεν κινεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική·
Z2 The starting point of an action—the efficient cause, not the final cause—is decision; and [the starting point] of a decision is a desire and goal-directed reasoning. This is why a decision cannot exist [i.e. be made] without intellect and thought nor without a state of character, for acting well and its opposite cannot exist [does not occur] without thought and character. And thought by itself moves nothing; but rather, goal-directed and activity-oriented thought [moves us].
[1139b5-11]
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων
μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ’ ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.
Ζ2 There is no deciding* on anything that has already happened; for example, no one decides to have sacked Troy, for no one deliberates about what has already happened, but rather about what will be and what can be otherwise. What has already happened does not admit of not having happened. Thus, Agathon correctly says,
For this alone even God is deprived:
To undo the things that have already been done.
[1141b14-18]
οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα γνωρίζειν‧ πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι‧
Practical wisdom (phronesis) is not only concerned with universal [truths]. It is, rather, necessary to be acquainted with the particulars [i.e., the facts about the situation]. For practical wisdom is action-centric, and action concerns the particulars [of the situation]. That’s why some people without knowledge of the universals are more effective in action than those who know them. This is especially the case for experienced people.
[1142a12-16]
σημεῖον δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ’ οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γω΄ψριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ’ ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν·
Ζ A sign (proof) of what has been discussed is the fact that while youths become geometers and mathematicians, wise in these sorts of things, there does not seem to be any practically wise youth. And the cause of this is that practical wisdom also involves the particulars [relevant to the practical situation], which become known from experience, and a youth has no experience, for a length of time is what macht/generates experience.
[1144a13-17]
…ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι’ ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι’ αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον)…
Ζ12 …for just as we say, some people who do just actions are not at all just, for example, those who do the things ordained by the laws either unwillingly/involuntarily or because of ignorance or because of some other reason and not because of the actions themselves (and yet, they *do* do the actions they should do and which the excellent person ought to do)…
[1144a28-29]
ἔστι δ’ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης.
Z13 Practical wisdom (prudence) is not this capacity [cleverness], but it is not without this capacity.
[1147a18-22]
Τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ’ οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται·
Η5 Saying words that come from knowledge is no sign [of it], for even the ones affected by these feelings can repeat scientific demonstrations and recite the epic poetry of Empedocles. And even those at the beginning of their studies [can] string together the words, though they do not yet know them. For it is necessary to unite with [the knowledge], but this requires time.
[1153b19-23]
οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. Διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν…
Η14 Some who assert that the person who is broken on the wheel or suffers great misfortunes are happy (εὐδαίμων), if they are good (ἀγαθός); either voluntarily or involuntarily they speak nonsense. But because of the fact that it seems fortune is also needed, some assert that good fortune is the same as happiness—but it is not, since even good fortune itself in excess is an impediment for happiness.
[1154a17-18]
ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ.
Η14 The vicious person is vicious on account of pursuing [pleasure] in excess, but not [pursuing] the necessary ones; for all enjoy in some way delicacies, wine, and aphrodisiacs, but not in the way one must.
[1155a4-16]
…ἔτι δ’ ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ’ ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ’ εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σῴζοιτ’ ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι’ ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τ’ ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις‧ “σύν τε δύ’ ἐρχομένω‧” καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι.
Θ1 …and friendship is most necessary for life, for no one would choose living without friends [even] while having all the remaining goods. For friends seem to be most necessary for the wealthy and for those who have acquired rule and power—for what advantage is there of such prosperity if one is lacking the opportunity to do good, which is done most of all and most laudably towards friends? Or how would one guard and preserve [prosperity] without friends? For the greater it is, the more unstable. And in poverty and the rest of the misfortunes people think their friends as their refuge. And for the young, [friendship is necessary] to avoid mistakes; for the old, for assistance and help for the actions they cannot do on account of physical weakness; and for those in their prime, friendship is necessary to accomplish fine (noble) actions, for as in ‘two going together…’* people are more capable of thought and action with friends.
[1155a22-28]
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ‧ ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ’ ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν‧ καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ’ ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.
Θ1 And friendship (φιλία) seems also to hold cities together, and lawmakers seem to care more about it than about justice (δικαιοσύνη), for harmony (ὁμόνοια, agreement, unanimity) seems to be something similar to friendship, and they aim at this (i.e. ὁμόνοια) most of all, and they drive out civil conflict as most hostile of all. When people are friends, there is no need of justice, but when they are [merely] just, they additionally need friendship; and the highest form of justice seems to be of a friendly quality.
[1159b7-12]
οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ’ ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. Οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις.
Θ10 But vicious people do not have stability [i.e. stable friendships], for they do not remain similar to themselves, but rather they become friends for a short time, enjoying each other’s vice. Useful or pleasurable people remain friends for a longer time, for as long as they provide pleasure or assistance to each other.
[1170b14-19]
εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ’ αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. ὃ δ’ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.
I9 If, then, for the blessed person, being (i.e. ‘living’, ‘existing’) is choiceworthy for the sake of itself—since it is naturally good and pleasant—and [given that] the being of their friend also resembles theirs*, the friend would also be choiceworthy. And what is choiceworthy for [the blessed person] must belong to them, or they will be deficient in this respect. The person who is to be eudaimonic, then, will need excellent** friends.
[1171b20-23]
ἰέναι δ’ ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ [τὸ] μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον)
I11 And inversely, it is fitting to go towards friends in misfortune without being called and eagerly, for it does well of a friend [to do so], and most of all to those in need and did not think themselves worthy of it, for to both this is more fine and pleasant.
[1172a8-10]
γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις)
I12 Thus the friendship of base people turn out vicious/wretched, for being unstable, they share in base activities/things, and become vicious/wretched by becoming similar to one another.
[1175a3-6]
πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ’ ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.
Κ4 How is it, then, that no one continuously feels pleasure? Is it because we become tired? For all things human are unable to continuously engage in activity. Thus, continuous pleasure does not arise, for it accompanies activity.
[1177b30-4]
εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ.
Κ If, then, intellect is divine as compared with a human being, then a life lived according to [the intellect] will be divine as compared with a human life. One should not follow the advice of those who say “You are human, so think as a human” nor “You are mortal, so think as a mortal”, but one should rather, as far as possible, hold off the mortal part of oneself and do everything to live a life in accordance with what is most excellent in ourselves [i.e., one’s intellect].
[1178b28-32]
ἐφ’ ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὴν τιμία, ὥστ’ εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.
K8 Thus, εὐδαιμονία extends as much as does contemplation, and the more contemplation there is [throughout one’s life], the more eudaimonic [one will be in one’s life], not accidentally, but in accordance with contemplation, for this is honorable itself, so as for εὐδαιμονία to be some kind of contemplation.
[1252a1-6]
ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν—τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες—δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας.
A1 Since we observe that every city is some kind of partnership, and every partnership is formed for the sake of some good—for, all people act for the sake of something that appears to be good—it is thus clear that while all aim at some good, the political partnership, which is most supreme and encompassing all the others, aims at the most supreme of all and highest good.
[1252a26-38]
ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἶον* θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι οἷον αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ ἀρχόμενον φύσει, διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὔτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὄπλα ‧ ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν
A1 Necessity then has it that those that are unable to be [i.e. to exist] without one another first couple together—namely, male and female for the sake of continued genesis (and this is not out of choice, but just as it is for the other animals and for plants, human beings naturally desire to leave behind another of the same sort [i.e. offspring, their image]), and ruler and subject, for their preservation, for human beings, when perfected, are the best of the animals, but, when separated from law and justice, they are the worst of all. For armed injustice is most dangerous. Humans are born with weapons for the sake of wisdom and virtue, which one may use for the worst ends. Thus, when devoid of virtue, human beings are the most unholy and most savage of animals, the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of human communities.
[1253a7-10]
διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων.
A1 And the reason is clear why human beings are more of a political animal than bees and any other ‘gregarious’ animal; for nature, as we say, does/makes nothing in vain, and human beings are the only animal which has speech/words.
[1253a14-19]
ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τἆλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.
A1 …and speech is meant to show what is advantageous and what is harmful, just as also what is just and what is unjust. For this is what makes human beings unique among the other animals: they alone perceive good and bad and just and unjust and the other perceptions, and it is partnership of these that makes a household and a state.
[1253a25-31]
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον: εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι’ αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. Φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν: ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος.
Α2 It is clear, then, that the city is according to nature and prior to the individual person, for if an individual is separated [from the city], they are not self-sufficient, and is like the parts of a whole. The person who is unable to live in common with others or who does not need to because they are self-sufficient without being a part of a city, must be either a beast or a god. The impulse towards living in common with others is naturally in everyone.
[1254a38-b3]
διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν.
A2 …because of which it is necessary to investigate the person in the best state/condition with respect to both body and soul, in whom this [i.e. that souls naturally rule over bodies] is clear. For among those that are bad or in a bad state/condition, it would seem that the body often rules the soul *on account of* their bad and unnatural condition.
[1254b34-1255a1]
…ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ’ ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν το τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.
A2 Since this [that there exist physically fit freemen and physically unfit slaves, contrary to what nature aims for] is clear, if the differences in body [of people] were as great as the statues of the gods, then everyone would say that the ones who were inferior are worthy of being enslaved to them [but not everyone says this]. And if this is true about the body, then it is much more just to draw this distinction for the soul. But the beauty of the soul is not similarly easy to see as the beauty of the body.
[1259a6-18]
πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὄν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος, εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν ἐλαιουργίων τῶν τ’ ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου μισθωσάμενον ἅτ’ οὐθενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ’ ὁ καιρὸς ἧκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα ὃν τρόπον ἠβούλετο πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα, ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν.
Thales Anecdote All these [anecdotes] are beneficial for those who value making money; e.g. the one of Thales of Miletus—for this was of making money, and though on account of his wisdom this is ascribed to him, it gets at something universal. Being reproached on account of his poverty for philosophy being useless, he—they say—observed from his knowledge of astronomy while it was still winter that there will be a large crop of olives; finding means to a little money, he paid deposits for all the olive presses of Miletus & Chios, for which he paid little because no one was in his way. When the time came and many were sought after at once and suddenly, he let them out any way he wanted, making a great fortune—showing that it is easy for philosophers to be rich if they want to be, but that money is not that for which they are eager.
[1314b39-1315a3]
ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἧττόν τε γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸ ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς)
[The tyrant-ruler] should always be seen as being particularly earnest in the service of the gods (for people are less afraid to suffer something against the law (an injustice) under rulers of this sort, if they think that the ruler is religious and reveres the gods; and they plot against the ruler less because they think that the ruler has even the gods as allies.
[1336a31-33]
καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς·
And concerning the tales and stories of the kind the children should hear—about this, the Directors of Education [of the city] should be careful. For all these sorts of things must prepare the way for the things later in their lives.
[1354a24-26]
οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον‧ ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν.
Α1 For it is wrong to/one must not distort the dicast (the jury) by leading them to anger, envy, or pity; for this would be as if someone who is about to use a straight-edge ruler were to make it crooked.”
[1354b7-12]
ὁ δ’ ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ἤδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν‧ πρὸς οὕς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον συνήρτηται πολλάκις, ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἱκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν.
Α1 …the member of the public assembly and the jury immediately judge the present and particular cases. Towards these, love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, in such a way that they are no longer able to see sufficiently the truth, but rather they obscure their judgment by their own pleasure or pain.
[1355a29-34]
ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ’ ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν.
Α1 Further, it is necessary to be able to persuade others of opposite positions, just as in deductions, not so we may do so (since it is wrong to persuade others of the wrong thing) but so the facts of the matter do not escape our notice and so when others argue unjustly, we may refute them.
[1356a6-11]
τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μη ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα·
Α1 …for we trust good people more as well as more quickly, concerning generally everything, but for things which there is no certainty but rather room for doubt, [we trust them] even absolutely. But [for this to count as persuasion by personal character in oration,] it must be the case that this occurs through the speech, and not through some pre-judged idea of the one speaking.
[1356a13-16]
διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· τοῖς πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας.
Α2 And [persuasion occurs] through the audience members, when they are led by the speech to emotion, for we do not deliver judgments in the same way when we are grieving or rejoicing, loving or hating. It is towards this [effect] alone that, as we have said, contemporary writers on rhetoric endeavor to focus.
[1358a35-b2]
ἔστι δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν‧ τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες. Σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστι, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.
Α3 The kinds of rhetoric are three in number, for that is how many kinds of listeners there are. For of the three elements that make up speech—the speaker, the topic and the one addressed—it is the one addressed on which the end depends; I mean, on the listener.
[1358a35-b2]
…ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστίν‧ μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂ εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι.
Α4 …but it is clear that council concerns what is subject to deliberation, that which is natural for us to take up and for which the principle of generation is in us. For we examine things until this point, until we find out whether or not to act is in our power.
[1360a18-28]
Εἰς δ’ ἀσφάλειαν ἅπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαϊειν‧ ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως…. αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτεινόμεναι φθείρονται οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἥξει εἰσ ὀλιγαρχίαν….
Α4 For the sake of security, it is necessary that the orator is able to behold all these things, but most of all to understand the legislation, for the security of the city-state depends on the laws…. All the others [i.e. all the forms of government excluding the perfect one] are destroyed either by being too relaxed or by being too strained. For example, democracy becomes weaker so that it will end in oligarchy not only if it is too relaxed [but also if it is too strained].
[1361a11-13]
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων‧ ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσιν.
Α5 …and similarly, for both the individual and the community, it is necessary to pursue the existence of these [excellences] in both their men and women; for those city-states where the state of women is bad, e.g. the Lacedaemonians, it is almost as if half are unhappy.
[1364b30]
καὶ τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα τῶν μὴ βεβαιοτέρων‧ ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει‧
Α7 And the things that last longer are better than those which are more fleeting, and the things that are more secure are better than those which are less so, for the use prevails when something lasts longer in time and when more secure in fulfilling our wishes.
[1365a35-b4]
καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο. διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι‧ τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ’ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἑλέσθαι.
Α7 And the things that aim at reality are better than those that aim at appearances. The ‘definition’ of that which aims at appearances consists in that which one would not choose were they likely to escape others’ notice. Through this it would seem to be the case that to be acted upon well (i.e. to receive benefits) is chosen more than to do upon others well (i.e. to give benefits), for to receive benefits is chosen even if no one were watching, but to do upon others well does not seem to be chosen if now one were watching.
[1365b16-19]
καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ’ ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἄν τις τὸν ἑτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δύ’ ἔχοντα‧ ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφῄρηται.
Α7 …and that which is beloved [is better than what is not]—the sort which some have just one, others have more. Wherefore the penalty were someone to blind a one-eyed person is not equal to the penalty were someone to half-blind a person with two eyes, for the one-eyed person has had that which is beloved taken from them.
[1367b22-27] ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως.
Α9 Since praise is based on actions, and it is characteristic of excellent actions to have been done on the basis of choice, we must try to show when a person acts on the basis of choice; and it is useful if a person appears to have done [excellent actions] often, and because of this one must take accidents and things from luck as based on choices, for if many similar [excellent actions] are brought forward, it seems to be a sign of virtue and choice.
[1367b37-1368a8]
ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. ἅ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γιγνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν ἅ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ, ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι δεῖ καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ αὑτόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ’ ἔπαινον μέγα φρονῶν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ αὑτόν. ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο: καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας.
Α9 Praise and advices have a common feature, for that which you would suggest in giving advice becomes an encomium [i.e. a speech of praise, e.g. the Encomium of Helen by Gorgias] if they are expressed differently. Thus since we grasp that which must be done and what qualities [as people] we must have, we must express these things differently and turn them…. Thus, whenever you want to praise someone, look at what you would suggest; whenever you want to suggest something, look at what you would praise.
[1368b12-15]
δι’ ἃ δὲ προαιροῦνται βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσι μοχθηρίαν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὃ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν….
Α10 Vice and akrasia are the things because of which people choose to harm others and do bad things that are against the law. For if people have one or more bad qualities, it is due to this by which they do bad things and are unjust.
[1370a3-14]
ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη· (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις.) καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ’ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ),
τὰς δ’ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς· ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ.
A10 …it must then be for the most part pleasant to go towards the state according to nature, and most of all when a natural process has come into its own state; habits are also [pleasant]. For what one has gotten used to becomes pleasant just as if it had come to be naturally, for habit is similar in a way to nature; for ‘often’ is close to ‘always’, and nature is of that which is ‘always’ while habit is of ‘often’. And [pleasant things are done] not by force, for force is contrary to nature, because of which compulsion is painful, as it is correctly said:
‘for all compulsory matters beget vexation’
If people are not accustomed to acts of concentration, serious engagement, and intense application, they are painful, for these are done by compulsion and force; but habit makes [them] pleasurable.
[1370a35-b3]
τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.
A11 The memories that are pleasant to remember, then, are not only (1) those which were pleasant when they were happening, but also (2) some that were not, if their outcomes later proved to be noble and good.
[1377b31-8a]
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ’ ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα· τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι περὶ οἷ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοὐναντίον·
Β1 For when people are feeling affectionate and are gentle, they take the same thing altogether differently or to a different degree than when they are feeling hateful and are angry; for when they feel affectionate towards the one [context in this text: in court] they are judging, they judge that they did no wrong or that they did little wrong; when they feel hate, they think the opposite.
[1379a38-b2]
…ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπερέχειν ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν.
Β2 And people are more/particularly angry about these cases [when others mock us for the qualities they care about most], if they suspect that they may not [in fact] possess those qualities [and thus are insecure about them], either wholly or not strongly. For whenever they very much think [i.e. are convinced] that they excel in them for which they are mocked, they pay no heed [to the others].
[1392b19-20…22-24]
…πάντες γἀρ, ὅταν δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γὰρ οὐδέν… ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι’ ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
Β19 …for all people do [the things] they want* whenever they are able to do them, for nothing is in the way… for, people—as a rule [i.e. for the most part]—whenever they can, do those things which they reach/yearn for (my note: the verb ὀρέγω literally means to stretch). Those that are bad through akrasia (lack of self-control) and those that are good because they long for good things.
[1403b15-18]
Οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον.
Γ1 For it is not enough to have the things which it is necessary to say, but it is necessary to say these things in the right way, and [doing so] contributes much towards the speech appearing to have some quality.
[1408b11-20]
τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς: συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες, ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅταν ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ *ἐνθουσιάσαι* ἢ ἐπαίνοις ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει “φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην” καὶ “οἵτινες ἔτλησαν”: φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα *ἐνθουσιάζοντες*, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλονότι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἥρμοσεν: *ἔνθεον* γὰρ ἡ ποίησις.
Γ Doubled words, plentiful epithets, and particularly unfamiliar terms are fitting for the person speaking passionately: for it is excusable for an angered person to exalt a bad thing to the heavens or to say it in exaggerated language. Whenever the speaker already has her/his audience in her/his control, she/he makes them *inspired* by praise or blame or passion or love, as, for example, Isocrates does in his Panegyricus towards the end: “φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην” and “οἵτινες ἔτλησαν”: For those who are *possessed by the gods* utter things like this to the effect of their audience accepting what they say because they (the audience) feel similarly. This is why [this type of speech] is fitting for poetry, for poetry is *inspired by the gods*.
[1448b4-15]
ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι [5] δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ.
Chapter 4 There seem to be some two causes of poetry in general coming into existence, and these are by [human] nature. For (1) imitation is natural to human beings from childhood and by this they are differentiated from the other animals, in that they are the most imitative [of all animals] and they learn their firsts through imitation. (2) And all find delight in imitative things. A sign of this is experience, for the things themselves that we see painfully, we delight to consider them when they are portrayed most accurately. For example, [we delight to see] the forms of the most depraved wild animals and of dead bodies. And the cause of this is that learning is the greatest pleasure not only for philosophers but also similarly for everyone else, though they share in this to a lesser extent.
[1450a16-9]
ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μιμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου· <ὁ δὲ βίος> ἐν πράξει ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης· εἰσὶν δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοι τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον.
Chapter 6 For Tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but of actions and of life. Moreover, life consists in action, and its telos (i.e. end, goal) is some sort of action, not some quality, and while some human qualities correspond with people’s characters, eudaimonia (i.e. happiness) and its opposite [for a life] correspond with their actions.
[1455a33]
διὸ εὐφυοῦς ἡ ποιητική ἐστιν ἢ μανικοῦ· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὔπλαστοι οἱ δὲ ἐκστατικοί εἰσιν.
Chapter 17 …on which account the poet is either naturally gifted (euphues) or mad/frenzied (manikos), for of these, the former finds it easy to mold himself [into any character] and the latter is lifted from himself (ekstatikos).