Understanding Nietzsche’s works is a long-term project I find important for my life. I was introduced to The Birth of Tragedy in the spring semester of the Humanities Sequence at Princeton University in 2015. Through my friend and scholar Merrick Anderson, pupil to Alexander Nehamas, I have thereafter been extensively introduced to Nietzsche’s ideas second-hand. It is not an exaggeration to say that my desire to read him (Kant, Hegel and Wittgenstein) in the original German played a large role in my decision to move to Germany in October 2018.
Now, after my first exploration of ‘evil’ and ‘hate’ a few weeks ago, seems as good as time as any to begin my independent close study of Nietzsche’s large body of work. I would like to create notes for myself to better my understanding. This post, like all my posts, is intended just for me, but if it is interesting or helpful for anyone else, that would of course make me happy 🙂 As I read and reread (and thus update my understanding of) Nietzsche, I will update it.
On the Genealogy of Morality: a Polemic
Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift
The quoted English translations of Nietzsche are Kaufmann’s.
Preface (Vorrede)
summary
After a short introduction wherein Nietzsche complains about men of knowledge (“Erkennenden”)—by which I believe he means men of high education—who very disappointingly lack self-knowledge, Nietzsche spells out the overall aim of his book: to discuss his ideas on the origin of moral prejudices (“über die Herkunft unserer moralischen Vorurtheile”).
[Fun! Note: In the midst of praising his thoughts, Nietzsche makes the claim that: “a fundamental will of knowledge, pointing imperiously into the depths, speaking more and more precisely, demanding greater and greater precision” (“aus einer gemeinsamen Wurzel heraus, aus einem in der Tiefe gebietenden, immer bestimmter redenden, immer Bestimmteres verlangenden Grundwillen der Erkenntniss”), “this alone is fitting for a philosopher” (“So allein nämlich geziemt es sich bei einem Philosophen”).]
Given the socio-political background within which Nietzsche was brought up, or so he claims, the question of morality, the question regarding the origin of good and evil, has been thrust at him, a real philosopher. This question, he claims, has been bothering him from his youth; when he was thirteen, he concluded that the “father of evil” (“Vater des Bösen”) must be God.
This idea, he later realized was stupid, because he, unlike others and luckily, learned “to separate theological prejudice from moral prejudice” (“das theologische Vorurtheil von dem moralischen abscheiden”). His question then became: “under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess?” (“unter welchen Bedingungen erfand sich der Mensch jene Werthurtheile gut und böse? und welchen Werth haben sie selbst?”). And, he thinks he has figured out the answers.
He wanted to keep his thoughts to himself, but reading The Origin of the Moral Sensations (1877) by Dr. Paul Ree, and finding it utterly wrong sentence by sentence, Nietzsche decided that he needed to clear up the societal confusion on these matters.
Nietzsche says that there is much at stake here; the various contemporary ideas on morality efface “the value of morality” (“Werth der Moral”) and “the value of the “unegoistic,” the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice” (“Werth des „Unegoistischen“, der Mitleids-, Selbstverleugnungs-, Selbstopferungs-Instinkte”). His contemporaries, he accuses, has instead turned to “the ultimate illness” (“die letzte Krankheit”), a “morality of pity” (“Mitleids-Moral”).
He thinks this newfound value on pity, this new morality of pity, and (also incidentally one of my least favorite things) the new focus on feelings are awful because they bring forth a new demand for “a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed”. The attempts to provide this origin story are, in Nietzsche’s opinion, absolutely pathetic and straight-up wrong. This is no way to treat the questions of morality, for which, Nietzsche thinks “there seems to be nothing more worth taking seriously” (“Mir nun scheint es umgekehrt gar keine Dinge zu geben, die es mehr lohnten, dass man sie ernst nimmt”).
Thus, he offers Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift. And, he adds quite comically for me, “If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it seems to me, is not necessarily mine.” (“Wenn diese Schrift irgend Jemandem unverständlich ist und schlecht zu Ohren geht, so liegt die Schuld, wie mich dünkt, nicht nothwendig an mir.”). For, those who do not understand are either those who have not read his other works—which of course they should have done—or those lacking in the art of reading, which requires “rumination” (“das Wiederkäuen”), an activity in which cows are more adept than men.
Essay 1: "Good and Evil", "Good and Bad" („Gut und Böse“, „Gut und Schlecht“)
Summary, interpolated with my [indented] thoughts
As the title suggests, this essay is where Nietzsche makes a distinction between the origin of the dichotomy between ‘evil’ and ‘good’ and the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’. These dichotomies, he asserts, have transpired from separated societal classes: the strong, or aristocratic peoples, developed the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and the oppressed, or slave peoples developed the dichotomy between ‘evil’ and ‘good’. There have thus developed divergent conceptions of in what ‘good’ consists.
Before he establishes this, Nietzsche first calls bull shit on the genealogies that many historians of morality have hitherto offered. The mainstream genealogy suggests that originally ‘unegoistic’ actions were called ‘good’ from the point of view of those who benefitted from those actions. By habitually praising ‘unegoistic’ actions as ‘good’, society eventually felt that such actions were ‘good’ simpliciter, forgetting its ‘utility’-based origins.
[Irrelevant but Fun! Side Note: Nietzsche hopes that these historians of morality claim these–what to him are–things because they have “trained themselves to sacrifice all desirability to truth, every truth, even plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, immoral truth.—For such truths do exist.—“. This, he thinks–despite producing misguided results–would at least be better than the other petty and pathetic motivations that drive people to produce idiotic and wrong ideas, e.g. “vis inertiae of habit”, “blind and chance mechanistic hooking-together of ideas”, “something purely passive, automatic, reflexive, molecular, and thoroughly stupid”, “a secret, malicious, vulgar, perhaps self-deceiving instinct for belittling man”, “a pessimistic suspicion, the mistrustfulness of disappointed idealists grown spiteful and gloomy”, “a petty subterranean hostility and rancor toward Christianity (and Plato) that has perhaps not even crossed the threshold of consciousness”, “a lascivious taste for the grotesque, the painfully paradoxical, the questionable and absurd in existence” and, my favorite, “an itching need for spice”.
This side note is not only fun but also interesting because of the clear importance Nietzsche places in the generation of one’s own ideas as is clear from Beyond Good and Evil. As we saw in the Fun! Note from my summary of the preface, Nietzsche finds “a fundamental will for knowledge” to be the defining characteristic of a true thinker. This will for knowledge is for Nietzsche certainly one of the most valuable things a person may have.]
Nietzsche thinks that this theory is idiotic, because he thinks it is obvious that “the judgment ‘good’ did not originate with those to whom ‘goodness’ was shown!” (“das Urtheil „gut“ rührt nicht von Denen her, welchen „Güte“ erwiesen wird!”) Instead, he asserts the following:
(Section 2) Rather it was “the good” themselves, that is to say, the noble, ‘powerful, high-stationed and highminded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to the low, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for values…. The pathos of nobility and distance, as aforesaid, the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a “below”—that is the origin of the antithesis “good” and “bad”.
Vielmehr sind es „die Guten“ selber gewesen, das heisst die Vornehmen, Mächtigen, Höhergestellten und Hochgesinnten, welche sich selbst und ihr Thun als gut, nämlich als ersten Ranges empfanden und ansetzten, im Gegensatz zu allem Niedrigen, Niedrig-Gesinnten, Gemeinen und Pöbelhaften. Aus diesem Pathos der Distanz heraus haben sie sich das Recht, Werthe zu schaffen, Namen der Werthe auszuprägen, erst genommen… Das Pathos der Vornehmheit und Distanz, wie gesagt, das dauernde und dominirende Gesammt- und Grundgefühl einer höheren herrschenden Art im Verhältniss zu einer niederen Art, zu einem „Unten“ — das ist der Ursprung des Gegensatzes „gut“ und „schlecht“.
Nietzsche thinks that the strong members of society (e.g. the citizens of Athens) did what they wanted to do, called it ‘good’, and thus created values upon which society was upheld. Subsequently, they identified ‘bad’ as those things found among the poor and weak members who were not in a position to enjoy the ‘good’ things in life, i.e. the things the strong members enjoyed and chose to value (e.g. large-scale donations, military accomplishments). And, Nietzsche thinks that while the strong may occasionally find it unfortunate that the weak lead ‘bad’ lives, they do not hold their views on what is valuable dogmatically for all people but instead simply rejoice in their own good fortune, utterly unbothered by the moral status of the weak members of their society of which they are the masters.
[Supporting and Fun! Side Note:] Nietzsche’s understanding of the attitude of the aristocratic classes immediately brings to mind my understanding of some Ancient Greek ethical works. In particular, it seems characteristic of what I perceive as Aristotle’s attitude that he is only concerned to spell out what εὐδαιμονία would consist in for an Athenian citizen (the aristocratic & slave-owning class which made up around 10% of the overall population) or, even stronger, that he thinks εὐδαιμονία is unattainable for a non-citizen.
This interpretation of his attitude is, like every topic in Aristotelian scholarship, at least a little controversial; some scholars try to interpret his views so that εὐδαιμονία may be something theoretically attainable for anyone. The intellectual virtues first and foremost (for which one needs extensive education and leisure to think—something in 350 BC Athens attainable only for rich, land-owning men) as well as many of the ethical virtues that are necessary to achieve εὐδαιμονία presuppose, or so I think, an aristocratic status.
One of the most obvious cases in support of my understanding of Aristotle’s ethics is the ethical virtue of ‘magnificence’, which differs from the other more-plausibly-attainable-for-a-poor-person ethical virtue of generosity (ἐλευθεριότης) in the following way: “for just as the name itself suggests, [μεγαλοπρέπεια] is expenditure that is fitting [πρἐπουσα] in its large scale [μέγεθος]” καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν (Ethica Nicomachea IV.2, 1122a22-3). One must have a lot of money and use it for great things for the greater society to achieve this virtue.
Furthermore, the following passage from Nietzsche’s essay immediately made me think of EN IV.3, the chapter on the ethical virtue of magnanimity (literally “great-souled”: μεγαλοψυχία), the ornamental (κόσμος) virtue of Aristotle’s ethical virtues:
(Section 10) To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long-that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modem times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done him and was unable to forgive simply because he forgot). Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others…
Seine Feinde, seine Unfälle, seine Unthaten selbst nicht lange ernst nehmen können — das ist das Zeichen starker voller Naturen, in denen ein Überschuss plastischer, nachbildender, ausheilender, auch vergessen machender Kraft ist (ein gutes Beispiel dafür aus der modernen Welt ist Mirabeau, welcher kein Gedächtniss für Insulte und Niederträchtigkeiten hatte, die man an ihm begieng, und der nur deshalb nicht vergeben konnte, weil er — vergass). Ein solcher Mensch schüttelt eben viel Gewürm mit Einem Ruck von sich, das sich bei Anderen eingräbt…
Compare the above passage with the following from EN IV.3:
Nor is he inclined to admire, for nothing is great to him; nor is he revengeful, for it is not of a great-souled person to call to mind memories, especially bad ones, but rather to look past them…. [The great-souled person] is not inclined to lament nor disposed to ask after necessities or small matters, for to be thus is for those who take these things seriously. (Translation is my own.)
οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός‧ οὐδεν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος‧ οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν…. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός‧ σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. (1125a2-5, 9-10)
Conversely, the oppressed members of society (e.g. Jewish peoples) had no choice but to live as they did in virtue of their political and socioeconomic weakness. They, or so Nietzsche argues, through ressentiment fueled by their suffering created the positive concept of ‘evil’ as a descriptor for their oppressors who they viewed as responsible for their state of being. Subsequently, they identified ‘good’ as a negative concept, i.e. that which is not as their oppressors do, and assumed value onto such negative concepts.
The contrast between the two developments—‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ and ‘evil’ vs. ‘good’—is quite stark, then, not only with regards to the content of the terms but also with regards to the sequence of development. I think both contrasts are well-articulated by Nietzsche in the following passage:
(Section 11) This, then, is quite the contrary of what the noble man does, who conceives the basic concept “good” in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates for himself an idea of “bad”! This “bad” of noble origin and that “evil” out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred-the former an after-production, a side issue, a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the original thing, the beginning, the distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality-how different these words “bad” and “evil” are, although they are both apparently the opposite of the same concept “good.” But it is not the same concept “good”: one should ask rather precisely who is “evil” in the sense of the morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely the “good man” of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler; but dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye of ressentiment.
Gerade umgekehrt also wie bei dem Vornehmen, der den Grundbegriff „gut“ voraus und spontan, nämlich von sich aus concipirt und von da aus erst eine Vorstellung von „schlecht“ sich schafft! Dies „schlecht“ vornehmen Ursprungs und jenes „böse“ aus dem Braukessel des ungesättigten Hasses — das erste eine Nachschöpfung, ein Nebenher, eine Complementärfarbe, das zweite dagegen das Original, der Anfang, die eigentliche That in der Conception einer Sklaven-Moral — wie verschieden stehen die beiden scheinbar demselben Begriff „gut“ entgegengestellten Worte „schlecht“ und „böse“ da! Aber es ist nicht derselbe Begriff „gut“: vielmehr frage man sich doch, wer eigentlich „böse“ ist, im Sinne der Moral des Ressentiment. In aller Strenge geantwortet: eben der „Gute“ der andren Moral, eben der Vornehme, der Mächtige, der Herrschende, nur umgefärbt, nur umgedeutet, nur umgesehn durch das Giftauge des Ressentiment.
The above concludes my summary of the first essay. Below, I list in no particular order other ideas included in the first essay that I find worth taking note.
The Blond Beast
[I’m still thinking about this concept. I don’t understand it enough to write even anything preliminary about it. One thing I want to note now is how perverted I think it is that the Nazis took something like this to provide pro-Aryan propaganda. I think it is perverted not only because pro-Aryan propaganda is perverted but also because they completely distorted Nietzsche’s concepts to fit their needs. Nietzsche is so anti-nationalistic and even anti-German in this essay that the theoretical usage Nietzsche’s blond beast has been put to use for really makes zero sense and goes to show how pathetically stupid people were to think that this idea they did not understand supported the claims they wanted to make.]
Nietzsche's Admiration of Jews
In combination with their strange pro-Aryan interpretation of Nietzsche’s blond beast, many readers of Nietzsche have been quick to read Nietzsche as an anti-semite. This interpretation isn’t prima facie entirely unreasonable, for he makes many harsh claims of criticism about Jewish (and Christian) developments in thought.
For example, here, Nietzsche equates Jewish (and Christian) thought to poison:
(Section 9) …everything is visibly becoming Judaized, Christianized, mob-ized…. The progress of this poison through the entire body of mankind seems irresistible…
…Alles verjüdelt oder verchristlicht oder verpöbelt sich zusehends (was liegt an Worten!). Der Gang dieser Vergiftung, durch den ganzen Leib der Menschheit hindurch, scheint unaufhaltsam…
Furthermore, in Beyond Good and Evil (for which the Genealogy of Morals is intended to serve as an addendum, see die Vorrede), Nietzsche articulates his thought that it is important to create values for oneself, i.e. the meaning of our lives arises from the creation of values for oneself. [Thank you to Merrick Anderson for informing me about this.] This important aspect of a meaningful life is, or so he argues in this first essay, exactly that which he explains is something the Jews (or at least their spiritual leaders) did/do not do. Together, these two pieces of evidence (the way in which he speaks of Jews and this critique) may make a reasonable, but non-careful reader think that Nietzsche is an anti-semite.
Quite the contrary, or so it seems to me; Nietzsche displays great respect for the Jews even while finding their reactionary value generation inferior to that of the aristocratic masters, the trans-cultural, trans-temporal class of blond beasts. Certainly his opinion of Jews is much higher than his opinion of Christians, who he thinks also possess a slave morality that is founded upon negative claims.
In particular, I think that Nietzsche greatly respects the Jews for having successfully carried out their “slave revolt”:
(Section 7) …with the Jews there begins the slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it-has been victorious.
…mit den Juden der Sklavenaufstand in der Moral beginnt: jener Aufstand, welcher eine zweitausendjährige Geschichte hinter sich hat und der uns heute nur deshalb aus den Augen gerückt ist, weil er—siegreich gewesen ist.
This slave revolt in morality, Nietzsche thinks, has been so successful that when in history the nobility has been overthrown, e.g. French Revolution, “greater rejoicing, more uproarious enthusiasm had never been heard on earth!” (“es wurde niemals auf Erden ein grösserer Jubel, eine lärmendere Begeisterung gehört!”). The idea that the rich and powerful are greedy, lazy and cruel persists to this day. This idea must have been particularly powerful in Nietzsche’s day in the age of conspicuous industrial robber barons.
And, despite the slave revolt’s origins tracing back to ressentiment, something Nietzsche thinks is awful, he also thinks the reasons for its success lie in certain effects that ressentiment brings about. Throughout his analysis of the Jews and Christians’ moral system, he praises many features of the Jews. Below are some examples:
(Section 10) …he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble. A race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance…
…er versteht sich auf das Schweigen, das Nicht-Vergessen, das Warten, das vorläufige Sich-verkleinern, Sich-demüthigen. Eine Rasse solcher Menschen des Ressentiment wird nothwendig endlich klüger sein als irgend eine vornehme Rasse, sie wird die Klugheit auch in ganz andrem Maasse ehren: nämlich als eine Existenzbedingung ersten Ranges…
(Section 11) …in their relations with one another show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control. delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship…
…die andrerseits im Verhalten zu einander so erfinderisch in Rücksicht, Selbstbeherrschung, Zartsinn, Treue, Stolz und Freundschaft sich beweisen…
(Section 14) …these black magicians, who make whiteness, milk, and innocence of every blackness—haven’t you noticed their perfection of refinement, their boldest, subtlest, most ingenious, most mendacious artistic stroke?
…dieser Schwarzkünstler, welche Weiss, Milch und Unschuld aus jedem Schwarz herstellen: — haben Sie nicht bemerkt, was ihre Vollendung im Raffinement ist, ihr kühnster, feinster, geistreichster, lügenreichster Artisten-Griff?
(Section 16) The Jews, on the contrary, were the priestly nation of ressentiment par excellence, in whom there dwelt an unequaled popular moral genius: one only has to compare similarly gifted nations—the Chinese or the Germans, for instance—with the Jews, to sense which is of the first and which of the fifth rank.
Die Juden umgekehrt waren jenes priesterliche Volk des Ressentiment par excellence, dem eine volksthümlich-moralische Genialität sonder Gleichen innewohnte: man vergleiche nur die verwandt-begabten Völker, etwa die Chinesen oder die Deutschen, mit den Juden, um nachzufühlen, was ersten und was fünften Ranges ist.
Clearly, I think, Nietzsche expresses his great admiration for their cleverness, persistance, prudence, humility, in-group support, and even artistic genius (something we know Nietzsche highly valued). He considers them to have really set the standard of making the most out of their given, bad situation.
Nietzsche's Critique of a Christian Teaching
The following thought is more or less identical to the idea I had while reading Dante several weeks ago. In fact it is this thought which I shared with my friend Merrick Anderson that prompted him to tell me to read GM Essay 1 for, he informed me, my thought was already articulated by Nietzsche years ago.
The thought goes something like this: Christian teaching, which manifests itself in many popular works, teaches that it is appropriate or even good to rejoice at the pain and suffering inflicted on sinners. An example of this teaching is found in the following passage from Dante’s Inferno Canto VIII:
[Lines 52-60] And I: ‘Master, I would be most eager // to see him pushed deep down into this soup // before we leave the lake.’ // And he to me: ‘Before the shore // comes into view you’ll have your satisfaction. // Your wish deserves to be fulfilled.’ // Soon I watched him get so torn to pieces // by the muddy crew, I still give praise // and thanks to God for it. (Hollander translation)
E io: “Maestro, molto sarei vago // di vederlo attuffare in questa broda // prima che noi uscissimo del lago.” // Ed elli a me: “Avante che la proda // ti si lasci veder, tu sarai sazio: // di tal disïo convien che tu goda.” // Dopo ciò poco vid’ io quello strazio // far di costui a le fangose genti, // che Dio ancor ne lodo e ne ringrazio.
So I don’t know about you, but my immediate reaction to reading this was of intense disgust (in the margin of my copy there is a 2014 penciled note “that’s awful” and a sad face). It seems to me just positively malicious of Dante to desire to see the Florentine Filippo Argenti suffer. How perverted it is for Virgil to think that Dante’s desire “deserves to be fulfilled”!? The idea of rejoicing in another person’s suffering, of wishing suffering upon another person… as a good idea….!? What is wrong with Christian doctrine!? This is my basic thought.
A nearly identical critique can be found in Nietzsche’s Essay 1 of GM. He mockingly says that Dante should have placed the sign “I too was created by eternal hate” at the entrance to Christian paradise (parallel to the equally, he thinks, absurd sign above his entrance to Christian hell “I too was created by eternal love”), paraphrasing Saint Thomas Aquinas’ views in Summa Theologiae III Supplementum, Q. 94, Art. I:
(Section 15) “Beati in regno coelesti,” he says, meek as a lamb, “videbunt poenas damnatorum, ut beatitudo nus magis complaceat.”
„Beati in regno coelesti“, sagt er sanft wie ein Lamm, „videbunt poenas damnatorum, ut beatitudo illis magis complaceat.“
The English translation of the above:
“The blessed in the kingdom of heaven,” he says, meek as a lamb, “will see the punishments of the damned, in order that their bliss be more delightful for them.”
Nietzsche does quote a more damning quote from Tertullian, but I forego including it here due to reasons of its length. In any case, Nietzsche critiques Christian teaching as driven by ressentiment, by hate and negative concepts, which manifests in this particular pervesion of moral teaching—a terrible evaluation in his eyes.
As is evident, I concur with Nietzsche’s evaluation of this particular feature of Christian doctrine. However, it seems to me that it would be unfair to dismiss the underlying assumptions from which this feature has been derived because of this feature’s untenability. The Christian doctrine relies on several assumptions regarding justice, including the justifiable nature of retribution. Justice, which is seen as one of the supreme goods, insofar as it is a good, is desirable, and thus believers of the faith ought to desire it. If sinners being punished for their sins is an instantiation of justice, then believers ought to desire sinners being punished. I don’t agree with this at all, but the train of thought can be reasonably followed.
Summaries of Essays 2 & 3 will be further added as I read them 🙂
Bibliography
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Zur Genealogie Der Moral: Eine Streitschrift Von Friedrich Nietzsche. C.G. Naumann, 1887.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, and Walter Kaufmann. On the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo. Vintage Books, 1989.
