Posterior Analytics II.19 is likely the most controversial chapter in the Organon; there is great debate on… basically… every… bit… of the chapter. I am particularly interested in the controversial topic of ἐπαγωγή, translated: ‘induction’, which famously appears in this chapter.
In this page I aim to jot down my own preliminary translation of An. Post. II.19 to improve my understanding of the text. I will further update this page in the long-term as my understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy & writing style and of Attic Greek more generally improves. For now I aim to stay as close to the ~vibes~ of the original Greek as possible, as was the methodology at the Latin and Greek Institute at CUNY. Of course I realize what you see below is not English… but neither is Greek.
[99b15] Περὶ μὲν οὖν συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἀποδείξεως, τί τε
ἑκάτερόν ἐστι καὶ πῶς γίνεται, φανερόν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπισ-
τήμης ἀποδεικτικῆς‧ ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν,
πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι καὶ τίς ἡ γνωρίζουσα ἕξις, ἐντεῦ-
θεν ἔσται δῆλον προαπορήσασι πρῶτον.
99b15 Concerning syllogisms and deductions, what each is and how they come to be, it is clear–concerning also demonstrative ‘scientific knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη), for they are the same. Concerning the ‘starting points’ (ἀρχαί), on the other hand, how they come to be known and which state makes them familiar, it will be clear upon first setting aside [our] preliminary doubts and difficulties.
[99b20] Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι’ ἀποδείξεως
μὴ γιγνώσκοντι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους, εἴρηται
πρότερον. τῶν δ’ ἀμέσων τὴν γνῶσιν, καὶ πότερον ἡ αὐτή
ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, καὶ πότερον ἐπι-
στήμη ἑκατέρου [ἢ οὔ], ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δ’ ἕτερόν τι γέ-
[25]νος, καὶ πότερον οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἕξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι
λελήθασιν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, ἄτοπον‧ συμβαίνει
γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνειν.
εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, πῶς ἂν γνωρίζοι-
μεν καὶ μανθάνοιμεν ἐκ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως; ἀδύ-
[30] νατον γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐλέγομεν. φα-
νερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὔτ’ ἔχειν οἷόν τε, οὔτ’ ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν
ἔχουσιν ἕξιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μέν τινα δύνα-
μιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ’ ἔχειν ἣ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ’
ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζῴοις.
[35] ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν‧
ἐνούσης δ’ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐγγίγνεται μονὴ τοῦ
αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δ’ οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγί-
γνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἃ μὴ ἐγγίγνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶ-
σις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι‧ ἐν οἷς δ’ ἔνεστιν αἰσθομένοις ἔχειν
[100a] ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά
τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιού-
των μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή.
99b20 Then, it has been said before that if one does not know (γιγνώσκω) the first/primary, immediate starting points, it is impossible through demonstration to know (ἐπισταμαι). But with respect to knowledge (γνῶσις) of the immediate [starting points], one might be puzzled 1) whether it is the same or not the same, 2) whether [there is] scientific knowledge of each (of the two), or [there is] scientific knowledge for the one but some other kind [of knowledge] for the other [25], 3) whether the states, not being in [us], spring up, or, being in [us], have escaped [our] notice.
On the one hand, if we were thus holding [the states] ourselves, that would be strange, for it would be the case that our having more precise knowledge (γνῶσις) than demonstration is escaping [our] notice. On the other hand, if we were not holding [the states] first, how might we gain knowledge and learn from no preexisting knowledge (γνῶσις)? [30] For it is impossible, just as we were also saying with regards to demonstration. It is therefore evident that neither is it possible to hold [the states] nor [do they] occur [when] people are ignorant and have no state at all. It is thus necessary to have some capacity, but not of the sort which will be more valued than those (?) according to exactness.
And it appears this exists in all the animals. [35] For there is an innate capacity to discern, which they call ‘perception’ (αἴσθησις). Perception is present; in some of the animals a preservation (μονή) of the perception occurs, in others it does not occur. Therefore, in those many for which [a preservation] does not occur, either entirely or concerning that which [a preservation] does not occur, there is no knowledge from the perceiving part; in those for which it is possible, perceivings are held [100a] still in the soul. Of the many [for which] these are produced, immediately some difference arises, so that in some, λόγος is born from the preservation of these, in others, not.
Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη,
ὥςπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομέ-
[5] νης ἐμπειρία‧ αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία
μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ’ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ κα-
θόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπα-
σιν ἕν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης,
ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.
[10] οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι αἱ ἕξεις, οὔτ’ ἀπ’ ἄλ-
λων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως,
οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἑνὸς στάντος ἕτερος ἔστη, εἶθ’
ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη
οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο. ὃ δ’ ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι,
[15] οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν. στάντος γὰρ τῶν
ἀδιαφόρων ἑνός, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ
αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου
[100b] ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ’ οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου)‧ πάλιν ἐν
τού-τοις ἵσταται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῆ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου, οἷον τοι-
ονδὶ ζῷον, ἕως ζῷον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι
ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον‧ καὶ γὰρ
[5] ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.
Then, just as we say, from perception memory is born, and from many times of the same memory experience is produced [5]; for the memories, many in number, is one experience. And from experience or from all quietude in the soul of the universal, the one beside the many, which may be one in all in those the same, a starting point of craft and of scientific knowledge [is produced]; whenever concerning [things] coming to be, of craft, and whenever concerning [things] being, of scientific knowledge. [10] Neither, then, do the states exist in [us] (ἐνυπάρχω) having been marked off by boundaries (ἀφορίζω), nor do they come about from other states better for knowing (γνωστικός), but [they come about] from perception. For example, in a battle, a turn (τροπή) comes about from one [soldier] making a stand, [causing] another to make a stand, and another, until it has come up to the starting point. And the soul, being the sort of thing it is, is such as to be able to have this happen.
[15] Let us (simply) say that which was said long ago, but not said clearly. For [when] one of the undifferentiated things takes a stand, a first, universal thing [comes about] in the soul. For, [although] it also perceives each thing, perception is of the universal [100b]. For example, [perception is] of man, but not of Callias, a man. Again [in the soul] is a stand taken, until the indivisible and universal things may take a stand. For example, such-and-such an animal, until ‘animal’, similarly in this way. It is clear, then, that in us the first things necessarily become known by ‘induction’ (ἐπαγωγή); for also [5] perception produces the universal in this way.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν
διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν,
αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ
δ’ ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον
ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώ-
[10] τεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ’ ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπι-
στήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶ-
ναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων
σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ’ οὐδ’
ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ’ ἐπιστήμην γέ-
[15] νος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ ἡ μὲν
ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ
πᾶν πρᾶγμα.
And since, of the states concerning thought by which we speak truth, some are always true and others admit falsity, e.g. ‘belief’ (δόξα) and ‘calculation’ (λογισμός), scientific knowledge and νοῦς are always true; and no other kind is more exact than scientific knowledge than νοῦς, and the starting points of demonstration more familiar; [10] and all scienticfic knowledge exists ‘with an account’ (μετὰ λόγου)… then there would not be scientific knowledge of the starting points. And since it is not possible for anything to be more true than scientific knowledge than νοῦς, thus νοῦς would be for the starting points—both from examining this and because demonstration is not a starting point for demonstration, just as scientific knowledge is not a starting point for scientific knowledge. If, then, we have no other kind [of state] besides scientific knowledge [15] that is true, νοῦς would be the starting point for scientific knowledge. And the starting point would be for the starting point, as it all holds with respect to all matters.
Aristoteles, et al. Aristotelis Analytica Priora Et Posteriora. E. Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1989.