This post is a roughly transcribed version of my hand-written notes on A.D. Smith’s paper, “Character and Intellect in Aristotle’s Ethics”. Like all my posts, this is intended just for me, but if it is helpful for anyone else, that would make me happy 🙂
"Character and Intellect in Aristotle's Ethics"
by A. D. Smith (University of Essex)
Phronesis, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1996), pp. 56-74
A. D. “David” Smith (1953-2017) Aristotle was a side-hobby, essentially, for this philosopher.
In this paper, Smith argues for an interpretation of Aristotle concerning the role of character and wisdom in the development and state of moral virtue that sidesteps the thorny and awful debate between the Humean and Intellectualist interpretations. Smith proposes that we instead focus on moral habituation’s role in the development of moral virtue. In particular, he argues that moral habituation is sufficient to instil obedience to reason.
Literary Landscape:
We all agree! [woohoo!] Aristotle thinks these things:
- character is important for the development of moral virtue (ἐθική ἀρετὴ)
- the development of moral virtue requires that we actually perform actions that correspond with virtue (we habituate to a virtuous state of the soul)
- virtue expresses itself in virtuous actions done for their own sake
- the ethical virtues require “being in accordance with right reason (orthos logos)… wisdom is such right reason.”
- moral virtue in the full/strict (κύριος) sense cannot be had without wisdom
What we[‘ve been] disagree[ing] on [for god damn the past century]:
“The controversy… is over what precise roles to give to each of these two aspects [character and wisdom (phronesis–the good state of practical intelligence)] of moral virtue in the full sense, and, in particular, which of these is to be given the leading role.” (p. 56)
[Note to self:] Smith uses ‘wisdom’ to translate φρόνησις, not σοφία.
(1) Humean-spirited interpretations want to give character the leading role, because ‘virtue makes the mark right, wisdom the things that conduce to this’ (1144a7-9) ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον and many such other passages.
Scholars: William Fortenbaugh’s Aristotle on Emotion 1975
At least Fortenbaugh [I’m not sure if Smith is being fair to other character-lead-interpretations] thinks that, in Smith’s words, “wisdom is required only when the action…” requires “some planning, deliberation and forethought”.
Why it sucks balls:
Virtue consists in obeying reason!!! Whatever happened to that crucial detail!? “Now I [Smith] believe Fortenbaugh restricts the scope of wisdom in the good practical life somewhat too severely.”
Combine this “with Aristotle’s insistence that deliberation is of what conduces to an end, not of ends, and that it is above all the ergon of the wise to deliberate well… the scope of intelligence is restricted to calculating how best to secure a goal that is antecedently set as good by the unreasoning part of the soul.” (p.57)
How does one who doesn’t already have natural virtue ever become virtuous!?
In Smith’s words, “the nature of moral virtue independent of wisdom, [Aristotle] likens it to a strong body that lacks sight and hence can stumble; he says, indeed, that such virtue without sight is harmful (N.E. VI.13)” (p.62).
(2) Intellectualists want to give wisdom the leading role, because the Humean-spirited interpreations of Aristotle, i.e. the ‘slave to the passions’ idea, which gives character the leading role, is really awful.
Some People: Terry Irwin’s ‘Aristotle on Reason, Desire, and Virtue’ 1975, David Wiggins’ ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’ 1973-4, Richard Sorabji’s ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’.
Why it [unfortunately] also doesn’t work:
Plays down the role of character to the point where it’s basically just a motivating power.
Conceptually pushed to make reason/deliberation set down the ends… (e.g. Irwin: ‘the correct choice of goods in themselves is the task of practical wisdom’, Wiggins: happiness and health are the only ends outside the scope of deliberation.) which is WTF in face of the many passages “where Aristotle says explicitly that wisdom presupposes a goal that is fixed by goodness of character.” (p.59).
‘virtue makes the purpose (prohairesis) right’, ‘the end, but not what conduces to the end, will be right as a result of virtue’, not reason but ‘virtue, either natural or habituated, is the instructor (didaskalikos) of judging rightly (orthodoxein) with respect to the first principle’
Cannot accommodate the fact that “a well-oriented character… is a sine qua non for… wisdom” (p. 60)
Aristotle’s account of proper education of the young: Q: education in reason or in habit first? A: the latter, states of want (orexis) should be attended to before reasoning and intellect (logismos and nous) Pol. 1334b8.
Relationship between wish & character: Aristotle goes through so much trouble to [clumsily and unsatisfactorily imho] argue that we are controllers of our character because our character is determined by the actions we willingly perform…. If he really held the intellectualist position, then arguing for the fact that we are in control of our character should be a piece of cake… BUT IT ISN’T.
[Note to self: Smith thinks some Intellectualists are working with a strawman of the view giving character the leading role.]
Problem: Both interpretations have soooooooo manyyyyyy passages that prima facie support their respective positions… that it seems like maybe Aristotle is the confused one, i.e. maybe his theory is incoherent…
“Aristotle seems to say that moral virtue consists in the unreasoning part of the soul being in a good state in relation to passions and actions, and that goodness here, is a matter of whether that unreasoning part of the soul obeys reason (logos). More particularly, the good condition seems to be one which disposes us to act and react in accordance with right reason–it being right reason which indicates the mean, aiming at which is the defining feature of moral virtue. Since wisdom is right reason, moral virtue seems to be a matter of following the dictates of wisdom. Wisdom, however, appears to be characterized as excellence in determining the best way to attain a goal that is already established as a goal by our character–the state of the unreasoning part of the soul… what the conjunction of these claims amounts to is that moral virtue is defined as the following of reason that is not, in itself, leading anywhere.”
BUT WE CAN’T HAVE THAT, i.e. “Aristotle is incoherent”, thus, Smith’s paper.
Smith's position:
His goal: to present a position that extricates Aristotle from both of these bad positions and from the charge of incoherence. Smith is concerned to find a position that meets these conditions:
“‘in accordance with (kata) right reason’ does not mean perfectly in accordance with it” (p. 64)
“the deliverances of moral virtue can in some way correspond with what would be the deliverances of wisdom, yet in a way that is compatible with ‘stumbling’, and, indeed, with bringing harm upon oneself.” avoiding this harm = utility of wisdom
[Note to self:] this language of the utility of wisdom is weird to me. Perhaps there’s a way other people understand of which I am as of yet totally unaware.
“does not deny to moral virtue its ability to guide wisdom”
Smith thinks there is only one way to do this, his way: understand reason more broadly and thereby understand how moral habituation, independently of wisdom, can suffice to instill obedience to reason, and also how such obedience can be the prerequisite and continuing condition of possessing wisdom, by being that in virtue of which our goal is good.
In Aristotle’s theory, there is a basic opposition between (1) reason / calculation (logismos) / thought (dianoia) / intellect (nous) and (2) passion (pathos). E.g. the good and bad person “are as different from one another as living according to reason is from living according to passion (1169a4-5)” (p. 65).
And, passion is inferior to reason. Aristotle thinks: a life led by passion == a life not worth living (i.e. a life of beasts and children). In particular (and “despite the fact that certain passions are peculiarly human and that most, if not all, have a cognitive dimention that exceeds that of perception and imagination” p. 65), appetite is responsible for making human beings a beast. Appetite is “the one passion that is simply deaf to reason” (p.66). “it is peculiar to man among all the animals to have perception of what is good and bad and just and unjust… (1253a11-18)” (p. 68).
Smith stresses that:
“The essence of moral virtue is not thus to be led by passion; and the only alternative is to be lead by reason. [18]” (p. 65)
My paraphrase of Footnote 18: 3 kinds of ‘want’ (orexis): 1. wish (boulesis) 2. appetite (epithymia) 3. spirit (thymos), reason only provides motivation in terms of wish (boulesis).
“We reach the good median state not by educating appetite, but by denying it: ‘we become temperate by abstaining from pleasures'” (p. 66). Why is this? Well, appetite is geared towards pleasure/pain. Reason is geared towards good/bad. Only by basically silencing appetite can we stop conflating pleasure/pain dichotomy with good/bad dichotomy. Appetite does moral harm to our characters/souls by acting independently of wish/purpose/reason and makes us mistakenly value pleasant things (particularly physically pleasant things) instead of fine/good things. Smith thinks that in Aristotle’s ethical theory thes is a more general fact about the motivational structure of human life, namely, the necessity to extinguish non-reason sources of motivation in a human life—to perceive, without distortion, what is good.
[Note to Self: Smith thinks is in virtue of human beings having foresight (pronoia) together with calculation (logismos) that allows us to look at things across time. And this, I think, is interesting in light of philosophy of personal identity!! Our perception of good/bad things across time allows us to evaluate things…. And this, I think, is interesting for the rise of normativity!!]
[Note to Self:] “Self-love, in the derogatory sense, characterizes those who are greedy in virtue of ‘gratifying their appetites and in general their passions and the irrational part of the soul'”, “Aristotle seems to have been of the opinion that it is appetite in this restricted [of the body] sense that is the source of the very worst in human behavior, since he mentions (only) sexual indulgence (aphrodisias) and gluttony in connection with his claim that humans are capable of being the wildest (agriotaton) and most unholy (anosiotaton) of creatures. (p. 66).
This is super interesting for Christian theology! / understanding why certain theologians have interpreted Aristotle as such and developed the Christian moral system from these sorts of thoughts.
This thought—to silence the passions—seems to be in obvious tension with the doctrine of the mean, because it seems to suggest that only the excess, not the deficiency of passion is bad. However, Aristotle basically thinks the deficiency doesn’t exist except maybe clinically—we all naturally incline to the excess (1118b15-16) so this isn’t even worth discussing, he thinks, is Smith’s idea.
Thus, if something can silence appetite and discourage the passions more generally, this allows for reason to lead the soul to moral virtue. What is this something? This something is habituation. How does Smith think this works for Aristotle?
The children “are encouraged to admire and perform actions that have concerns other than pain and pleasure, are praised for themselves perfoming such actions, and reprimanded and shamed for giving in to passion all the time” (p. 71). i.e. Pavlovian conditioning! The trainers, best case scenario, possess wisdom, too.
Step 1 for a child: “to want things other than pleasure and to take satisfaction in the active pursuit of such.” (p. 71). The goal of the trainer is to lead a developing moral character to acquire the correct practical universals. This will give rise to the right wishes and with the habituated silencing of other motivational sources, i.e. appetites and spirit among the wants (orexis), the child will develop the correct motivational structures. One thereby instils in a child concern for what is fine/good instead of what is simply pleasurable.
Smith recognizes that he has spelled out a negative conception of how to define good, i.e. eliminate passions, he wants us to know that there is positive content here. One does indeed have to value fine/good things for extinguishing the passions to be useful. One does have to have a motivational structure subject for adjustment.
Bibliography
Smith, A. D. “Character and Intellect in Aristotle’s Ethics.” Phronesis, vol. 41, no. 1, 1996, pp. 56–74.
